This 'we are better at criticism of the statements of others than creating our own' is, I think, an important piece of the puzzle regarding 'best decision making'. Another piece is how our own convictions work and why they are normally stronger than our own observations and reasonings (for evolutionary reasons, I estimate, both for the speed of the individual as the effectiveness of the tribe, it might thus be evolutionary necessary for us to automatically believe our own bullshit and to believe what close 'relatives' tell us — see https://ea.rna.nl/2022/10/24/on-the-psychology-of-architecture-and-the-architecture-of-psychology/)
This 'collaborative criticism' has been part of my setup for Enterprise/IT decision making/governance since I first set it up myself. This means that criticism is important, but it needs to happen in a collaborative setting (we manage the criticism consent-based in a group, adversarial criticism doesn't work). So, we have all forms of peer review at all sorts of levels. This is embedded in the 'political organisation' that an enterprise is, but if it works well enough (and doesn't become adversarial) it can coexist with and maybe even stabilise the political 'hacking'. But I have also seen 'political hacking' destroy the 'collaborative criticism' as it was seen as 'adversarial'.
Food for thought. Thank you for repeating it here.
No one - so far - is making negative comments about this piece - which would be in spirit of the piece, right?
One thing - Gelman doesn’t exactly quote Cowen out of context, but the full quote makes clear that Cowen thinks the risk of going negative is that it’s the easy way out - it can be an obstacle to thinking harder.
“2. Avoid criticizing other public intellectuals. In fact, avoid the negative as much as possible. However pressing a social or economic issue may be, there is almost always a positive and constructive way to reframe your potential contribution. This also will force you to keep on thinking harder, because it is easier to take apparently justified negative slaps at the wrongdoers.”
"...we are more likely to be closer to the truth when we are trying to figure out why others may be wrong, than when we are trying to figure out why we ourselves are right."
In prediction markets, when others are wrong they put their money up at a bad price. When I can figure out why they're wrong, I profit by moving the price to what I think is a better price. I don't even have to bother thinking about what I think is right.
How can you claim to be doing this with a straight face when half the universe of political opinion -- conservatives -- is barely represented in academia?
Moreover, doesn’t the fact of that underrepresentation indicate that academics have been failing to choose good interlocutors, -- graduate students -- for several generations now?
The Enigma of Reason, published in 2019, is currently ranked #54,033 in Books on Amazon. It has 305 ratings. Amazon suggests "Thinking in Systems" is frequently bought with it.
Thinking Fast and Slow, published in 2013, is currently ranked #30 in Books on Amazon. It has 39,316 ratings. Amazon suggests that "The Psychology of Money" and "Read People Like a Book" are frequently bought with it.
My negative comments on this situation are, first, that Amazon really ought to recommend these books together. Second, while both books have their merits and defects, I suspect that Thinking Fast and Slow tells us the story we prefer to hear. Perhaps that is because it focuses on individual rather than collective cognition. However that may be, it does suggest limits to the power of criticism: the 3rd party listening to the debate has its own biases and interests - the marketplace of ideas is rigged.
Very good indeed.
This 'we are better at criticism of the statements of others than creating our own' is, I think, an important piece of the puzzle regarding 'best decision making'. Another piece is how our own convictions work and why they are normally stronger than our own observations and reasonings (for evolutionary reasons, I estimate, both for the speed of the individual as the effectiveness of the tribe, it might thus be evolutionary necessary for us to automatically believe our own bullshit and to believe what close 'relatives' tell us — see https://ea.rna.nl/2022/10/24/on-the-psychology-of-architecture-and-the-architecture-of-psychology/)
This 'collaborative criticism' has been part of my setup for Enterprise/IT decision making/governance since I first set it up myself. This means that criticism is important, but it needs to happen in a collaborative setting (we manage the criticism consent-based in a group, adversarial criticism doesn't work). So, we have all forms of peer review at all sorts of levels. This is embedded in the 'political organisation' that an enterprise is, but if it works well enough (and doesn't become adversarial) it can coexist with and maybe even stabilise the political 'hacking'. But I have also seen 'political hacking' destroy the 'collaborative criticism' as it was seen as 'adversarial'.
Food for thought. Thank you for repeating it here.
No one - so far - is making negative comments about this piece - which would be in spirit of the piece, right?
One thing - Gelman doesn’t exactly quote Cowen out of context, but the full quote makes clear that Cowen thinks the risk of going negative is that it’s the easy way out - it can be an obstacle to thinking harder.
“2. Avoid criticizing other public intellectuals. In fact, avoid the negative as much as possible. However pressing a social or economic issue may be, there is almost always a positive and constructive way to reframe your potential contribution. This also will force you to keep on thinking harder, because it is easier to take apparently justified negative slaps at the wrongdoers.”
https://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2020/02/how-public-intellectuals-can-extend-their-shelf-lives.html
"...we are more likely to be closer to the truth when we are trying to figure out why others may be wrong, than when we are trying to figure out why we ourselves are right."
In prediction markets, when others are wrong they put their money up at a bad price. When I can figure out why they're wrong, I profit by moving the price to what I think is a better price. I don't even have to bother thinking about what I think is right.
How can you claim to be doing this with a straight face when half the universe of political opinion -- conservatives -- is barely represented in academia?
Moreover, doesn’t the fact of that underrepresentation indicate that academics have been failing to choose good interlocutors, -- graduate students -- for several generations now?
The Enigma of Reason, published in 2019, is currently ranked #54,033 in Books on Amazon. It has 305 ratings. Amazon suggests "Thinking in Systems" is frequently bought with it.
Thinking Fast and Slow, published in 2013, is currently ranked #30 in Books on Amazon. It has 39,316 ratings. Amazon suggests that "The Psychology of Money" and "Read People Like a Book" are frequently bought with it.
My negative comments on this situation are, first, that Amazon really ought to recommend these books together. Second, while both books have their merits and defects, I suspect that Thinking Fast and Slow tells us the story we prefer to hear. Perhaps that is because it focuses on individual rather than collective cognition. However that may be, it does suggest limits to the power of criticism: the 3rd party listening to the debate has its own biases and interests - the marketplace of ideas is rigged.