"The immediate risk is not that the US invades Europe, but that it withdraws support from Ukraine."
Well that's an unfortunate bit of question-begging. You ought to have either supported the very odd claim that the US has not yet withdrawn support from Ukraine, or simply left it out; your argument would have been stronger for its absence.
The US has partially withdrawn support, but there are still weapon sales, intelligence and targeting info, cyber defense, drone financing, and other things. We could and should be doing much more but withdrawal of current support would hurt Ukraine.
While it is true that the current level of American support is not literally zero, it is so greatly diminished that I do not consider it reasonable to say that support has not yet been withdrawn. In fact, the token support currently offered seems designed expressly to deceive the American public as to the extent of withdrawal. Support from Europe now greatly exceeds that from America in all areas: weapons, money, civil repair, and intelligence sharing.
What this analysis captures very well is the Schelling logic of commitment over flexibility — and the EU’s latent leverage once escalation is made credible.
But there’s a structural risk here that sits slightly outside classic crisis-bargaining theory. In highly mediated, multi-level systems like the EU, it’s possible to build increasingly “credible” commitment devices while simultaneously dissolving any clear locus of strategic authorship. Escalation can become structurally locked-in without being actively owned.
In that setting, the danger isn’t European weakness, but over-correction: binding instruments that outlive the political capacity to interrupt, recalibrate, or take responsibility once conditions change. Credibility then hardens into path-dependence, not deterrence.
Schelling assumed actors who could still decide when to stop. The harder question for Europe is whether it can design escalation mechanisms that preserve interruptibility — not just credibility — in a world where markets, legal triggers, and institutional momentum increasingly act faster than political judgment.
I liked Havel's paragraphs on what keeps the system going because, I had asked that question some 20 years ago to a Polish economist. His answer then was "The Terror".
"The implication, then, is that the European Union might be much more credible with the Bessents of the world if they could more readily bind themselves to take painful or difficult steps to counter aggression. However, the European Union’s member states often look at the problem differently. They are worried about delegating security power to the European Commission, for fear it will do something that hurts their economic interests or other national interests. The Schelling argument is that this increases their flexibility, but weakens their ability to demonstrate resolve against outside threats."
You could be describing the central problem of Canadian federalism here.
Am i the only one missing even a single remark hinting at the EU's dismal democratic layout? Then again, i AM European. (And Dutch first. I apologise for Mark Rutte's English, he is a bit of a throw back. And the ultimate liberal slickster, we had teflon-Mark in charge for a decade...).
Hungary may openly oppose and obstruct EU policies, you will find majorities in almost every European country - including the UK - supporting a number of key Hungarian complaints (lack of European democracy, over-regulating, immigration policy, the energy 'transition', left wing dominance ((pushing through gender ideology etc)).
But i guess because those aren't the author's complaints he can effortlessly dismiss them, ánd Europe's massive democratic deficit. And he HAS to ignore it because a more democratic Europe would elect wholly different EU leaders, producing wholly different policies, certainly not aligned with the author's.
So adios democracy, democratic love comes in waves...
'...but that it withdraws support from Ukraine...It would precipitate a major crisis in transatlantic relations, causing likely economic crisis, as the stock market wobbles suggest.'
Just a year ago 'experts' triumphantically announced a new EURO era as the dollar had become unattractive because of Trump's tariffs. That 'era' lasted a few months.
The true economic crisis ahead, apart from an ever expanding Brussels led regulations-based economy, is making UA an EU member. Poland, France, Italy would (and already) vehemently oppose that, and the North, already keeping Southern interest rates low, is not going to pay for UA's upkeep. Let alone for the many B that, let's say, find creative destinations.
'And it would mean that the US would suddenly lose its major hold over Europe, making Europe much more likely to start pulling out of the US technology stack, arming up even more quickly,'
Lose hold? The US is Europe's #1 LNG supplier, #2 oil supplier and #3 coal supplier. There is no European equivalent of the US tech stack. China is building one though...
We are not 'arming up quickly', at all. At least 1/3 of Germany's increased 'defense spending' goes directly to keeping non defense industries alive which are heavily impacted by the high costs of energy since 2022. All European countries (and the UK) see the RU 'threat' as a chance to increase spending, increase debt taking and support failing non defense industries (claiming some far fetched 'defense' ties). Brussels uses the 'threat' to further federalize without further democratising (the notion alone...Bah).
Finally, the US has become a rather popular destination for European and British energy intensive core industries like chemicals. The economical impact of losing these clusters is huge.
'If you are Europe, and you think of the end-stage as ‘the day that the US pulls out of Ukraine,’ then you may have strong incentives not to challenge the US, since it is going to be less hurt in the end than you are. If you are Europe, and you instead think of the end-stage as ‘the day after the day that the US pulls out of Ukraine, when Europe erupts and the US economy goes to hell,’ you may very plausibly revise your calculations, and be more willing to escalate.'
Ok, Europe (the NL) here: is this the 'stop or i commit suicide' argument?
You can pull that one off only once.
As an abstract thinker you may see it as a reasonable strategy. As a 'player' in the real world i'd say 'happy games' and focus on what is really on my plate.
PS. In february 22' a Dutch tv-economist wrote in his blog 'We have the power!'as he crowed about the first EU energy sanctions on Russia. I protested 'We are a customer without a reasonable alternative'. But he was adamant we had the power. Soon after we were scrambling to keep the real power running and gov rationing campaigns began...
"(1) The European Commission proposes an investigation into some other country that is apparently coercing the US." -> that is apparently coercing the EU?
Sorry to say, but especially appearing in the Times, this essay had a touch too much armchair warrior for me. If the President of the USA is threatening Greenlanders with the loss of their sovereignty, the first responsibility for Americans is to consider what they should do to stop it (I do understand that you hail from Ireland, but the piece was published in the US paper of record). I also wonder what game theory says if one of the players is clearly too cognitively impaired to understand the stakes ("Psychologically, I need to own it"). As far as I can tell, it is not entirely clear if the assured financial destruction in the aftermath of the bazooka would be mutual (which was the foundation of strategic thinking in the Cold War) or if the US would come out on top. I don't think it was designed with the US as intended target. So I am inclined to give European leaders some slack. Most of them have negotiated directly with Trump and are presumably better judges of the situation than those of us on the sidelines.
It seems to me (and I'm just a retired small town administrator from the Midwest) (and the skeeviest sort of 'peopIe' I ever had to deal with were the loot-and-run real estate developers) (which, I guess, is a sort of qualifying thing, given the character and behavior of Drumpf and the Three Stooges noted herein); but,
My recent reading of the alliances, strengths and movements in the Ukraine war suggest that their walking away, to a large degree, from the connivery coming at them from Washington and the transnational financialist mafia, would lose the Ukrainians nada. They've found other resources, including their own.
> The implication, then, is that the European Union might be much more credible with the Bessents of the world if they could more readily bind themselves to take painful or difficult steps to counter aggression.
For all your fancy game theory terms, there is a fundamental problem in your analysis:
The only means Brussels has to counter aggression amount to sending increasingly strongly worded letters.
Just read the NYT piece, and I came here to say bravo, and brave!
I like that the anti-coercion instrument could be used against persons. It's too late now but Bezos got married in Venice and all the tech bros showed up. It would have been a shame if something had happened to the visas of some of them....
On a more serious note, retaliating could be costly, at least before things deescalate, and Europe should be ready to compensate those europeans who suffer from the retaliation. Not easy but doable. Of course, the big downside risk is that all of this will further encourage country-level nationalism in Europe, at the same time as the EU countries are remilitarizing. We'll see but, again, nice piece.
Yes, let's sabotage to only European industry that's still semi-functional. The tourism industry based on the fact that European city centers, at least the ones that haven't been destroyed by modernism architecture, are still great open air museums.
Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, conservative bellwether in The Daily Telegraph, editorializing today (Jan 21) that international investors should get out of the U.S. Treasury bond market:
"Trump has crossed all lines: it is time to cut off his global credit card. America has lost its credibility. The only thing that can stop the president is the bond market"
Lately I've noticed that I've developed a cackle.
It's the sort of cackle that people get when they know a huge train wreck is coming, they can do nothing to prevent it, and nobody else has noticed.
"The immediate risk is not that the US invades Europe, but that it withdraws support from Ukraine."
Well that's an unfortunate bit of question-begging. You ought to have either supported the very odd claim that the US has not yet withdrawn support from Ukraine, or simply left it out; your argument would have been stronger for its absence.
The US has partially withdrawn support, but there are still weapon sales, intelligence and targeting info, cyber defense, drone financing, and other things. We could and should be doing much more but withdrawal of current support would hurt Ukraine.
While it is true that the current level of American support is not literally zero, it is so greatly diminished that I do not consider it reasonable to say that support has not yet been withdrawn. In fact, the token support currently offered seems designed expressly to deceive the American public as to the extent of withdrawal. Support from Europe now greatly exceeds that from America in all areas: weapons, money, civil repair, and intelligence sharing.
ah. "Greatly exceeds." nevertheless
What this analysis captures very well is the Schelling logic of commitment over flexibility — and the EU’s latent leverage once escalation is made credible.
But there’s a structural risk here that sits slightly outside classic crisis-bargaining theory. In highly mediated, multi-level systems like the EU, it’s possible to build increasingly “credible” commitment devices while simultaneously dissolving any clear locus of strategic authorship. Escalation can become structurally locked-in without being actively owned.
In that setting, the danger isn’t European weakness, but over-correction: binding instruments that outlive the political capacity to interrupt, recalibrate, or take responsibility once conditions change. Credibility then hardens into path-dependence, not deterrence.
Schelling assumed actors who could still decide when to stop. The harder question for Europe is whether it can design escalation mechanisms that preserve interruptibility — not just credibility — in a world where markets, legal triggers, and institutional momentum increasingly act faster than political judgment.
This is old news to you, but some readers might find it interesting: https://paulwells.substack.com/cp/185300716
I liked Havel's paragraphs on what keeps the system going because, I had asked that question some 20 years ago to a Polish economist. His answer then was "The Terror".
Exactly. And “The Terror” is what Trump and his goons are trying to establish via Minneapolis right now.
"The implication, then, is that the European Union might be much more credible with the Bessents of the world if they could more readily bind themselves to take painful or difficult steps to counter aggression. However, the European Union’s member states often look at the problem differently. They are worried about delegating security power to the European Commission, for fear it will do something that hurts their economic interests or other national interests. The Schelling argument is that this increases their flexibility, but weakens their ability to demonstrate resolve against outside threats."
You could be describing the central problem of Canadian federalism here.
Oh dear, academics and boardgames...
Am i the only one missing even a single remark hinting at the EU's dismal democratic layout? Then again, i AM European. (And Dutch first. I apologise for Mark Rutte's English, he is a bit of a throw back. And the ultimate liberal slickster, we had teflon-Mark in charge for a decade...).
Hungary may openly oppose and obstruct EU policies, you will find majorities in almost every European country - including the UK - supporting a number of key Hungarian complaints (lack of European democracy, over-regulating, immigration policy, the energy 'transition', left wing dominance ((pushing through gender ideology etc)).
But i guess because those aren't the author's complaints he can effortlessly dismiss them, ánd Europe's massive democratic deficit. And he HAS to ignore it because a more democratic Europe would elect wholly different EU leaders, producing wholly different policies, certainly not aligned with the author's.
So adios democracy, democratic love comes in waves...
'...but that it withdraws support from Ukraine...It would precipitate a major crisis in transatlantic relations, causing likely economic crisis, as the stock market wobbles suggest.'
Just a year ago 'experts' triumphantically announced a new EURO era as the dollar had become unattractive because of Trump's tariffs. That 'era' lasted a few months.
The true economic crisis ahead, apart from an ever expanding Brussels led regulations-based economy, is making UA an EU member. Poland, France, Italy would (and already) vehemently oppose that, and the North, already keeping Southern interest rates low, is not going to pay for UA's upkeep. Let alone for the many B that, let's say, find creative destinations.
'And it would mean that the US would suddenly lose its major hold over Europe, making Europe much more likely to start pulling out of the US technology stack, arming up even more quickly,'
Lose hold? The US is Europe's #1 LNG supplier, #2 oil supplier and #3 coal supplier. There is no European equivalent of the US tech stack. China is building one though...
We are not 'arming up quickly', at all. At least 1/3 of Germany's increased 'defense spending' goes directly to keeping non defense industries alive which are heavily impacted by the high costs of energy since 2022. All European countries (and the UK) see the RU 'threat' as a chance to increase spending, increase debt taking and support failing non defense industries (claiming some far fetched 'defense' ties). Brussels uses the 'threat' to further federalize without further democratising (the notion alone...Bah).
Finally, the US has become a rather popular destination for European and British energy intensive core industries like chemicals. The economical impact of losing these clusters is huge.
'If you are Europe, and you think of the end-stage as ‘the day that the US pulls out of Ukraine,’ then you may have strong incentives not to challenge the US, since it is going to be less hurt in the end than you are. If you are Europe, and you instead think of the end-stage as ‘the day after the day that the US pulls out of Ukraine, when Europe erupts and the US economy goes to hell,’ you may very plausibly revise your calculations, and be more willing to escalate.'
Ok, Europe (the NL) here: is this the 'stop or i commit suicide' argument?
You can pull that one off only once.
As an abstract thinker you may see it as a reasonable strategy. As a 'player' in the real world i'd say 'happy games' and focus on what is really on my plate.
PS. In february 22' a Dutch tv-economist wrote in his blog 'We have the power!'as he crowed about the first EU energy sanctions on Russia. I protested 'We are a customer without a reasonable alternative'. But he was adamant we had the power. Soon after we were scrambling to keep the real power running and gov rationing campaigns began...
Europe did have problems with gas supply in 2022. But it's 2026 now.
"(1) The European Commission proposes an investigation into some other country that is apparently coercing the US." -> that is apparently coercing the EU?
Sorry to say, but especially appearing in the Times, this essay had a touch too much armchair warrior for me. If the President of the USA is threatening Greenlanders with the loss of their sovereignty, the first responsibility for Americans is to consider what they should do to stop it (I do understand that you hail from Ireland, but the piece was published in the US paper of record). I also wonder what game theory says if one of the players is clearly too cognitively impaired to understand the stakes ("Psychologically, I need to own it"). As far as I can tell, it is not entirely clear if the assured financial destruction in the aftermath of the bazooka would be mutual (which was the foundation of strategic thinking in the Cold War) or if the US would come out on top. I don't think it was designed with the US as intended target. So I am inclined to give European leaders some slack. Most of them have negotiated directly with Trump and are presumably better judges of the situation than those of us on the sidelines.
It seems to me (and I'm just a retired small town administrator from the Midwest) (and the skeeviest sort of 'peopIe' I ever had to deal with were the loot-and-run real estate developers) (which, I guess, is a sort of qualifying thing, given the character and behavior of Drumpf and the Three Stooges noted herein); but,
My recent reading of the alliances, strengths and movements in the Ukraine war suggest that their walking away, to a large degree, from the connivery coming at them from Washington and the transnational financialist mafia, would lose the Ukrainians nada. They've found other resources, including their own.
Tim Long, Just Up the Hill from Lock 15.
"(1) The European Commission proposes an investigation into some other country that is apparently coercing the US."
Does the US need EU assistance in resisting coercion?
> The implication, then, is that the European Union might be much more credible with the Bessents of the world if they could more readily bind themselves to take painful or difficult steps to counter aggression.
For all your fancy game theory terms, there is a fundamental problem in your analysis:
The only means Brussels has to counter aggression amount to sending increasingly strongly worded letters.
the only aggression Greenland was facing was a supercilious Treasury Secretary sneering about working groups.
Also, what do US libertarians/right always bang on about? Freedom. Who are the good guys? Those who fight for freedom.
Invoking freedom (every five words or so) directly to Trumps base, will in their minds frame Greenland in these terms. Cheap, free and easy.
Just read the NYT piece, and I came here to say bravo, and brave!
I like that the anti-coercion instrument could be used against persons. It's too late now but Bezos got married in Venice and all the tech bros showed up. It would have been a shame if something had happened to the visas of some of them....
On a more serious note, retaliating could be costly, at least before things deescalate, and Europe should be ready to compensate those europeans who suffer from the retaliation. Not easy but doable. Of course, the big downside risk is that all of this will further encourage country-level nationalism in Europe, at the same time as the EU countries are remilitarizing. We'll see but, again, nice piece.
Yes, let's sabotage to only European industry that's still semi-functional. The tourism industry based on the fact that European city centers, at least the ones that haven't been destroyed by modernism architecture, are still great open air museums.
What could possibly go wrong?
Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, conservative bellwether in The Daily Telegraph, editorializing today (Jan 21) that international investors should get out of the U.S. Treasury bond market:
"Trump has crossed all lines: it is time to cut off his global credit card. America has lost its credibility. The only thing that can stop the president is the bond market"
that's a wonderful idea, they should do that.
In 2025 China ran a $1.2 trillion trade surplus.
Where can they put $1.2 trillion?